Defence & Security Podcast Network

Recent public backlash over the suspected involvement of Pine Gap in the ongoing conflict with Iran has once again raised concerns about Australia's sovereignty, its status as an "imperial" province or valued partner and the future of Pine Gap and other US bases in the country.

The 300-person gathering at Pine Gap in Alice Springs signals a periodic spike rather than a structural acceleration of Australia's anti-bases movement, according to Dr Nicole Townsend, war studies lecturer and director of UNSW Canberra's Second World War Research Group, Asia-Pacific. Yet the movement's durability warrants close attention from defence industry and policymakers alike.
Speaking with news editor Robert Dougherty, UNSW Canberra historian Dr Nicole Townsend argues that recent protests reflect a cyclical resurgence driven by geopolitical instability, not fundamental shift in public opposition to US military cooperation.
Pine Gap dominates anti-bases consciousness not because it is Australia's only joint facility – several operate under Australia–US agreements, maintaining the fiction that no foreign bases exist on Australian soil – but because of what isn't publicly known. Townsend emphasises that protesters' core complaint isn't demand for disclosure; it's the philosophical tension: if you cannot tell us what happens here, should it be here? That secrecy, necessary for intelligence operations, defines the facility's place in public imagination.
What distinguishes the movement is its deliberately assembled coalition. Townsend's David Scott Mitchell Fellowship research into the Australian Anti-Bases Campaign Coalition reveals extraordinary heterogeneity: unions, teachers associations, Indigenous groups, pro-Palestine activists and Greens politicians coexist under an umbrella targeting US basing. Yet this breadth obscures fragmentation. A recent national survey of 1,500 Australians found roughly one-third neutral on bases – neither supportive nor opposed – complicating assumptions about movement momentum. Lowy polling suggests 50–55 per cent support US basing, 43 per cent opposed.
Historically, these movements spike during geopolitical anxiety – Cold War nuclear fears, Iraq War opposition in 2003 – then subside. Current resurgence reflects Middle Eastern instability and Indo-Pacific uncertainty rather than new anti-American sentiment.
Townsend cautions against predicting trajectory. Media framing shapes which groups appear prominent; political contexts shift suddenly. Precedent exists for direct action targeting defence expos in the 1990s. But whether current momentum continues upward, stabilises or declines depends on variables historians cannot forecast.
The movement remains a barometer of Australian strategic anxiety, not a settled political force.
Enjoy the podcast, 
The Defence Connect team

Port Wakefield is not a replica of Camden. This distinction matters enormously. James Heading, director and general manager for missiles and fire control at Lockheed Martin Australia, has spent 18 months driving that message home to critics who dismiss the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System operation as mere assembly.
The risk reduction activity that concluded with successful live-fire testing earlier this year was never about final-form production. It was methodical de-risking: importing weapons kits from Arkansas, standing up Australian manufacturing processes, qualifying teams in explosive handling and weapons assembly, and crucially extracting the tacit knowledge embedded in American production – then questioning why certain processes exist at all.
That interrogation has yielded reciprocal innovation. Australian engineers have challenged inherited US procedures, clarifying ambiguous processes, suggesting alternatives that improve manufacturing robustness and reduce waste. Heading describes a two-way street where US counterparts now learn from Australian precision-engineering heritage inherited from automotive manufacturing.
The real strategic architecture emerges with the weapons manufacturing complex now in detailed design. Port Wakefield was the proof of concept. The next facility will embed flexibility: modular layout, scalable production capacity targeting 4,000 GMLRS annually (versus 14,000 in Camden), and future-proofing for Prism precision-strike missiles and emerging hypersonic systems. Crucially, it positions Australia as a force multiplier in global supply chains, where specialised components – canards, control actuation systems, castings and optics – matter as much as final assembly.
The bottleneck remains an unspoken demand signal. Heading emphasises that industry cannot scale investment without clarity on procurement numbers. How many GMLRS does Defence need? What about air defence effectors for LAND 6504? Lessons from Europe and Middle Eastern conflicts inform strategy but don't dictate it.
Without articulated demand, Australia risks capability infrastructure without corresponding production velocity.
Enjoy the podcast,
The Defence Connect Spotlight team

Microsoft 365 is the backbone of many Australian businesses – but are organisations doing enough to secure the platform itself? Tune in to David Hollingworth and CoreView's vice president of APAC sales, Andrew McAllister, as they tackle the risks and what businesses can do to build genuine resilience.

Microsoft 365 may be ubiquitous, but that doesn't mean it is secure by default. Hollingworth and McAllister explore the often-overlooked risks lurking in tenant configurations, administrative privileges and guest accounts, and explain why organisations need to take greater responsibility for how their Microsoft environments are configured and governed.
The conversation also examines how attackers are exploiting compromised admin accounts to manipulate settings, bypass security controls, and gain deeper access to sensitive data. McAllister explains why the traditional Microsoft 365 admin model can create an unnecessarily large blast radius, and how organisations can apply least privilege, role-based access and tighter identity controls to reduce their exposure.
Finally, Hollingworth and McAllister examine what a mature Microsoft 365 resilience strategy should look like – from establishing a secure configuration baseline and detecting configuration drift to automated remediation and recovering the tenant itself after a serious compromise.
Listen to the full episode to find out why backing up your data isn't enough – and what organisations need to do to protect the "glass" holding it.
Enjoy,
The Cyber Uncut team

How can Australia strengthen the protection of critical defence infrastructure while navigating the modern drone-heavy environment?
In this episode of the Defence Connect Podcast, Stephen Kuper and Robert Dougherty unpack a series of developments across Australia's defence and national security landscape, including drone incursions over RAAF Base Williamtown, the expansion of Australia's first-person view drone capabilities, major defence industry partnerships and emerging opportunities for Australian technology exports.
Discussion includes the recent swarm of unidentified drones observed over RAAF Base Williamtown and Newcastle Airport, with the team examining the implications for the protection of Australia's air bases and high-value military assets.
The team also explores the Australian Army's growing focus on FPV drones and cooperation with New Zealand, including the development of short-range drone specialist capabilities and the role of Australian instructors in supporting New Zealand's capability development.
Attention then turns to Rolls-Royce's expanded Australian defence operations, including its new Canberra headquarters and partnership with Melbourne-based Marand Precision Engineering to supply specialised anti-submarine warfare propulsion systems for the UK's Type 26 frigate program.
The panel also examines the significant agreement between the Australian and UK governments covering CEA Technologies' radar technology, with discussion focusing on the potential scale of the export opportunity and what the partnership could mean for Australia's sovereign defence technology industry.
The episode then looks at the Global Combat Air Programme and ongoing speculation about whether Australia could eventually join the sixth-generation combat aircraft initiative.
Rounding out the episode, the pair discuss Australia's growing defence engagement with the Pacific Islands, including the Pukpuk Treaty and cooperation with Papua New Guinea, the opening of Australian-supported border outposts in Solomon Islands, and the potential for deeper regional defence cooperation.
Enjoy the podcast,
The Defence Connect team

An adversary's numerical advantage is something Australia faces across all domains, but the cyber domain is one area where Australia can offset that advantage, building true asymmetric capabilities.

The cyber battlespace has undergone a step change with the arrival of frontier AI models. What took penetration testers two years to accomplish, Tom Scully from Palo Alto Networks completed in three weeks when paired with Claude's Mythos model. That compression has collapsing vulnerability windows and forces a fundamental rethink of how Defence operates its security operations centres.
The asymmetry cuts both ways. Attackers now possess tools that dramatically compress exploitation timelines. But for the first time in cyber space, defenders can achieve parity through agentic AI – autonomous agents embedded in security operations that multiply human operator capacity by orders of magnitude.
Palo Alto's own security operations centre covers 23,000 users across eight data centres and 85,000 customers with just 15 people across two global locations operating 24/7/365. That scale is impossible without AI and machine learning disciplined into an integrated platform. Now, agentic AI adds the next layer: individual security operators deploying multiple AI agents to handle discrete tasks – network analysis, endpoint evaluation, reverse engineering – each agent maintaining human oversight yet operating with delegated authority.
The critical challenge is governance. Only 6 per cent of organisations possess AI governance frameworks. Scully emphasises that the framing is not about free will; it resembles a military command structure. Commanders delegate authority, set rules of engagement, define reporting protocols and remain accountable for outcomes. AI agents operate identically – given clear direction, guardrails and escalation paths.
Australia must urgently establish governance standards aligned to ISO 42001 or NIST frameworks, then enforce those standards through security tooling. Without that foundation, organisations will struggle to defend against attackers armed with frontier AI.
The decisive question is not whether to deploy agentic AI, but whether Defence can implement it faster than adversaries exploit the window before our cyber defences mature.
Enjoy the podcast,
The Defence Connect Spotlight team