Geoeconomic Competition

How is the European Union redefining economic security in an era of geopolitical tension? In this episode of Geoeconomic Competition, Francesca Ghiretti sits down with François Chimits, Head of the Europe Program at Institut Montaigne, to examine the EU’s progress, its strategic direction, and the challenges it still must overcome.

At the end of January 2026, Qiushi published a 2024 speech by Xi Jinping that, among other themes, underscored the strategic importance of having a global reserve currency. In this episode of Geoeconomic Competition, Gerard DiPippo breaks down China’s evolving ambitions for an internationalised renminbi, and how realistic Beijing’s ambitions are.

Europe and the US are racing to bring manufacturing back home - but should they be? Inspired by an article from The Economist, Chris Miller, Professor of International History at Tufts’ Fletcher School and author of Chip War, digs into the real economic benefits of manufacturing. We unpack why policymakers are so keen on factories, whether manufacturing still delivers meaningful gains in jobs and growth, and what it might mean for advanced economies to fully embrace a service-led future.

With the EU and China reaching price undertakings on Chinese EV imports, this episode features Ágnes Szunomár, Associate Professor at Corvinus University of Budapest, to unpack the scale, motives, and consequences of Chinese investment in Europe’s BEV sector. The discussion probes whether Chinese investments in the sector can become genuine growth poles for European supply chains or remain technologically self-contained enclaves. We examine what Europe gains in terms of strategic know how, industrial competitiveness, and market share. Finally, we assess how these developments reshape Europe’s economic dependencies and strategic autonomy in the green transition.

In the final 2025 episode of Geoeconomic Competition, Yanmei Xie tackles the big questions behind China’s anti-involution campaign. What distinguishes involution from overcapacity, and why does that distinction matter? Why is China’s overcapacity treated as a  problem when similar conditions elsewhere are not? And can the anti-involution drive meaningfully address China’s economic challenges? Finally, could it ease some of the core tensions between China and the EU?