This Means War

The reticence of Western governments to use Land Forces on operations has been notable of late. Dr Jack Watling, from RUSI in London, talks through the reasons for this, the lessons from Ukraine (and whether these are different from lessons from other theatres), whether both the battlefield is transparent and if dispersion is helping, the strategies being employed by various belligerents, counter C2 warfare (with specific emphasis on the IDF experiences), logistics, the human requirement when technology becomes the driving force, and the reality of Ukrainian drone operations. What emerges from the discussion is that if you want assurance in reaching political goals when undertaking war, you must employ land forces – and you must have the scale to make them effective: doing it on the cheap or on a small scale (ie anything below Army Group) just won't cut it.

Despite all the diatribes written about the UK's 2026 Defence Investment Plan, the root of the issue wasn't identified; that the plan was about military hardware and not about the UK's National Security. Ewan Lawson talks about three aspects of the DIP that underline this. First, the UK's missile and air defence plans as an example of the military's attitude towards societal resilience and critical national infrastructure: Hybrid war is a Transition to War (in old money) and not a synonym for 'peace'. Second, the reality of cyber operations today; what has been learned from recent operations in terms of value-for-money (or not) that cyber provides as an exploitation or effect. Third, the worrying nature of the UK-US relationship (both militarily and politically) as it has degraded since 2001. The latter is vital for the UK's national security but it feels like there is a delusion in some areas that all is well, when patently it isn't.

The parliamentary committees responsible for scrutiny of the Ministry of Defence on behalf of society and tax-payers can't perform their roles effectively. Government departments, political and military leaders just don't seem to care: perhaps it is worse than that. According to Mike Martin, former military veteran and now Member of Parliament for Tunbridge Wells, they actively obfuscate and hinder scrutiny and proper governance. To provide the adequate governance and public assurance of the military and the department of state, select committees need teeth as well as a mouth with which to embarrass governments. Mike provides three suggestions for improvements, and a dose of reality on the scrutiny process.

How prepared are states for national emergencies and contingencies? Russian actions in Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden, and the Baltic States have triggered a number of nations to re-energise their national resilience and preparedness planning moving from a 'Just-in-Time' to a 'Just-in-Case' mentality. In the UK, as pointed out by Lord Toby Harris (chair of the UK's National Preparedness Commission), the understanding of the risk by successive governments is high; their willingness to do anything about it is low. Investing in resilient infrastructure, meaningful engagement with businesses and third sector groups, and having honest conversations with the public just don't appear as coherent government actions. As Toby explains, this level of neglect is symptomatic of a much longer-term malaise: it is even embedded in the Treasury department's process for prioritising public investments. For over 20 years, Lord Harris has been chivvying and annoying successive British governments by raising preparedness and resilience as a topic that needs addressing. This episode gives a flavour of where the UK sits in being ready for the next national emergency.

If you think MDO is a prescription for how the US will fight, think again. Colonel (retired) Richard Creed, Director, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, explains how the concept has evolved since 2018 culminating in the publication of FM3-0 in 2025. Rich also explains how and why the NATO concept differs so much from the US one, and why the US can't simply make their doctrine into one for the Alliance. Covering the five approaches, the levels of applicability, and the command and control conundrum of MDO for the US Army, the conversation focuses on authorities and responsibilities as much as the philosophy of warfighting. Fascinating stuff.